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Abstract 
As of October 2011, in the context of the TARGET2 payment system, the Bundesbank had accumulated a total 
claim of 465 billions € on the rest of the Eurosystem, that is on the other National Central Banks of the euro zone 
and the ECB. The growing claims of the Bundesbank and, to a lesser extent, the National Central Banks of 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland, are the counterpart of growing liabilities of the distressed peripheral 
countries of the euro area. Since the beginning of these crises the rising claims of the Bundesbank correspond to 
rising liabilities of the National Central Banks of Ireland, Greece and Portugal, and recently Italy and Spain. 
 
The central bank of the Eurozone is in fact a set of several institutions known as the Eurosystem. It is composed 
of the European Central Bank and all the 17 National Central Banks of the member countries. Cross border 
payments  between  banks  of  different  countries  of  the  euro  area  are  conducted  through  a  system  known  as 
TARGET2. Through this payments system banks can transfer to each other claims on the National Central 
Banks,  known  as  “central  bank  money”  or  “reserves”.  Through  TARGET2,  each  cross  border  transaction 
between countries belonging to the Euro area gives rise to a gross claim of a National Central Bank on another 
National Central Bank. Indeed the National Central Bank of the country of the “paying” bank needs to borrow 
claims on the National Central Bank of the country of the “receiving” bank, in order to transfer these claims to 
this bank. The National Central Bank of the country of the “paying” bank has thus to borrow reserves from the 
National Central Bank of the country of the “receiving” bank, before transferring the property of these reserves 
to this “receiving” bank. At the end of each day, the claims or liabilities of National Central Banks on or to each 
other are netted and replaced by a  net claim or a net liability of each National  Central Bank on or to the 
Eurosystem.  These  daily  net  claims  or  liabilities  are  added  to  the  cumulated  TARGET2  balances  of  each 
National Central Bank built up since the launch of the euro.  
Until 2007, the current account deficits of the peripheral countries of the Euro area were compensated by net 
capital inflows. Since 2008 however, the banks of Germany and other core countries are reluctant to lend to the 
banks of the peripheral countries, which also experience huge capital outflows. The growing imbalances of 
TARGET2 accounts are caused by a sustained reversal of capital flows. Net capital outflows now add to the 
structural imbalance of the current account of peripheral countries, due to a lack of competitiveness. The balance 
of payments imbalances of the distressed countries benefit from a kind of monetary funding by the Bundesbank. 
If the euro zone broke up, the Deutsche Bundesbank could incur enormous losses on its TARGET2 related 
claims  on  the  Eurosystem.  In  such  a  scenario,  the  Bundesbank  should  be  recapitalized  by  the  German 
government, at the expense of the German taxpayer. Even without a breakup of EMU, the Bundesbank should 
bear 30% of the potential losses of the distressed countries’ National Central Banks loans to their banks which 
lack good quality assets to provide as collateral.  
 
 




A picture of the problem 
If anything was still necessary to show that there is something wrong with the Eurosystem for 
several years, the following graph would certainly be much convincing. 
 
 
As  of  October  2011,  in  the  context  of  the  TARGET2  payment  system,  the  Bundesbank  had 
accumulated a total claim of 465 billions € on the rest of the Eurosystem, that is on the other National 
Central Banks of the euro zone and the ECB.  
The National Central Banks of the distressed countries are the borrowers 
The  growing  claims  of  the  Bundesbank  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  National  Central  Banks  of 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland, are the counterpart of growing liabilities of the distressed 
peripheral countries of the euro area. Since the beginning of these crises the rising claims of the 



























































































































































































































TARGET2  related claims of the Bundesbank on the Eurosystem 














































































































































































































Target2 related liabilities of the Bank of Greece to the Eurosystem  











































































































































































Target2 related liabilities of the Central Bank of Ireland to the 
Eurosystem  






However the crisis has quickly spread to Italy and Spain. The Bank of Italy, which was structurally a 






























































































































































































































Target2 related liabilities of the Banco do Portugal to the Eurosystem, 
Millions €, january 1999 to september 2011 
Target2 related liabilities of the Banco do Portugal to the Eurosystem, Millions €, january 1999 








































































































































































































































Bank of Italy Target2 related claims on the Eurosystem  
Millions €, january 1999 to october 2011 
Bank of Italy Target2 related claims on the Eurosystem Millions €, january 1999 to october 







The current large imbalances in the TARGET2 accounts split the Eurosystem into a very small group 
of creditor countries and the others. 
 
 
National Central Banks claims on, or liabilities to the rest of the Eurosystem 
October 2011 
 
   Claims   Liabilities    
Bundesbank  465  118  Central Bank of Ireland 
Central Bank of Luxembourg  85  108  Banco de España 
Nederlandsche Bank  89  101  Bank of Greece 
Bank of Finland  33  89  Banca d'Italia 
      57  Banco do Portugal 
      42  National Bank of Belgium 
      35  Bank of France 
      29  Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
      9  Central Bank of Cyprus 
      11  National Bank of Slovakia 
      2  Bank of Slovenia 
      1  Central Bank of Malta 
      -  Bank of Estonia 
      70  European Central Bank and errors 
Total  672  672    


















































































































































































Target2 related liabilities of the Banco de España on the Eurosystem  




The extreme anomaly of this situation can be well perceived when comparing it with what 
continuously prevailed before the crisis, for example as of December 2005. 
 
 
National Central Banks claims on, or liabilities to the rest of the Eurosystem 
December 2005 
   Claims   Liabilities    
Bundesbank 
                   
30   35  National Bank of Belgium 
Bank of Spain 
                   
13   16  Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
Bank of France 
                   
11   13  Banco do Portugal 
Central Bank of Luxembourg 
                     
8   7  Bank of Greece 
Bank of Italy 
                     
8   5  Bank of Ireland 
Bank of Finland 
                     
1   1  Nederlandsche Bank 
European Central Bank 
                     
5        
error 
                     
1        
Total 
                   
77   77    
Source: National Central Banks statistics, ECB  
 
What do these loans represent? 
The  central  bank  of  the  Eurozone  is  in  fact  a  set  of  several  institutions  known  as  the 
Eurosystem. It is composed of the European Central Bank and all the 17 National Central 
Banks of the member countries. A common policy is determined at the ECB for the whole 
euro area, but euro banknotes are issued by the National Central Banks and the refinancing 
operations are also decentralized: liquidity is provided by each National Central Bank to the 
banks of its country. The banks hold their reserves at the National Central Bank of the country 
where they are located. They borrow liquidity from the National Central Bank of the country 
where they are located. 
Cross border payments between banks of different countries of the euro area are conducted 
through a system known as TARGET2. Through this payments system banks can transfer to 
each  other  claims  on  the  National  Central  Banks,  known  as  “central  bank  money”  or 
“reserves”.  For  example,  if  a  Greek  bank  transfers  money  to  a  German  bank  through 
TARGET2, the net claim of the Greek bank on the National Central Bank of Greece decreases 
and the net claim of the German bank to the National Central Bank of Germany increases. In 
this example a claim of a Greek bank on the Bank of Greece has vanished to become a claim 
of a German bank on the Bundesbank. 
Through TARGET2, each cross border transaction between countries belonging to the Euro 
area gives rise to a gross claim of a National Central Bank on another National Central Bank. 
Indeed the National Central Bank of the country of the “paying” bank needs to borrow claims 




claims to this bank. The National Central Bank of the country of the “paying” bank has thus 
to borrow reserves from the National Central Bank of the country of the “receiving” bank, 
before transferring the property of these reserves to this “receiving” bank
1. 
At the end of each day, the claims or liabilities of National Central Banks on or to each other 
are netted and replaced by a net claim or a net liability of each National Central Bank on or to 
the Eurosystem. These daily net claims or liabilities are added to the cumulated TARGET2 
balances of each National Central Bank built up since the launch of the euro.  
The  transactions  through  TARGET2  can  be  financial  as  well  as  commercial.  Growing 
TARGET2-related claims on the Eurosystem thus reflect accumulated balance of payments 
surplus.  Rocketing  TARGET2-related  liabilities  of  the  distressed  countries  reflect 
accumulated balance of payments deficits.  
Until 2007, the current account deficits of the peripheral countries of the Euro area were 
compensated by net capital inflows. Since 2008 however, the banks of Germany and other 
core  countries  are  reluctant  to  lend  to  the  banks  of  the  peripheral  countries,  which  also 
experience huge capital outflows.  
 
How are these imbalances caused by capital outflows? 
As  mentioned  above,  the  growing  imbalances  of  TARGET2  accounts  are  caused  by  a 
sustained reversal of capital flows. Net capital outflows now add to the structural imbalance 
of the current account of peripheral countries, due to a lack of competitiveness. Investors and 
banks of core euro area countries are reluctant to renew their exposure to the economy of the 
peripheral  countries. The  governments  of the peripheral  countries have lost access  to  the 
international market. Banks of the distressed countries have also lost access to the interbank 
market. 
                                                           
1 For example if a deposit in a Greek bank is transferred by the client to a German bank, the sequence of events can be described as follows 
-  The Greek bank borrows the necessary liquidity to the National Central Bank of Greece (the Bank of Greece), which credits the 
reserve account of this bank. 
-  The Greek Bank instructs the National Central Bank of Greece (the Bank of Greece) to transfer this liquidity to the German Bank, 
in order to credit the deposit account of the client in this bank.  
-  The National Central Bank of Greece thus needs reserves at the National Central Bank of Germany, to transfer them to the 
German bank. The National Central Bank of Greece borrows these reserves from the National Central Bank of Germany. The 
National Central Bank of Germany thus credits the daily temporary account of the National Central Bank of Greece (the Bank of 
Greece). In counterpart the National Central Bank of Greece (the Bank of Greece) credits the daily temporary account of the 
National Central Bank of Germany (the Bundesbank). 
-  The National Central Bank of Greece (the Bank of Greece) then debits the reserve account of the Greek bank  
-  The German National Central Bank (Bundesbank) debits the account of the Greek National Central Bank and credit the reserve 
account of the German bank, which credits the deposit account of the client 
As a result the net liabilities of the National Central Bank of Greece (the Bank of Greece) to the German National Central Bank (the 
Bundesbank) increase 




For example the data for Greece show the reversal of the funding of Greek banks by the other 







































































































































































































Debt of the Greek banks to banks of other countries of the euro zone, 
millions € 








































































































































































































Liabilities of the Greek banks to banks of other countries out of the 













































































































































































































domestic private deposits in Greek banks 









































































































































































































foreign deposits in Greek banks,  





A key aspect of a currency union is that a deposit in a bank of a member country must have the same 
value as a deposit of the same amount in a bank of another member country.  
What the growing imbalances in TARGET2 accounts reveal is that the markets do not believe 
that euro deposits in different countries of the euro zone have equal value.  
 
Consequences for Germany 
Losses if the Euro area breaks up 
If the euro zone broke up, the Deutsche Bundesbank could incur enormous losses on its TARGET2 
related claims on the Eurosystem. In such a scenario, the Bundesbank should be recapitalized by the 
German government, at the expense of the German taxpayer. 
If distressed countries leave the euro, their new national currencies will quickly depreciate with respect 
to the euro. They will not be able to reimburse their previously accumulated TARGET2 related debt of 
the  departing  countries  that  will  still  be  denominated  in  euro’s  and  will  dramatically  raise  when 
expressed in the new national currencies.  The National Central Banks of the remaining countries of 
the Eurosystem will thus incur huge losses.  
If the departing countries attempt to convert these TARGET2 related debts into their new currencies, 
despite  legal  obstacles,  the  depreciation  of  these  currencies  will  also  cause  huge  losses  to  the 
remaining National Central Banks of the Eurosystem. 
Potential losses on the regular refinancing operations of the Eurosystem 
As shown above, the growing claims of the Bundesbank and a few other NCB’s on the Eurosystem are 
accompanied by rising loans of the distressed countries’ National Central Banks to their commercial 
banks. In view of the fragility of these banks, and their lack of good quality assets to propose as 
collateral, the risks of losses have strongly increased for the Eurosystem. The ECB has even been 
compelled to lower the quality requirements on the assets accepted as collateral from the banks of the 
distressed countries for the regular refinancing operations of the Eurosystem. The losses on regular 
refinancing loans to the banks are bear by the whole Eurosystem, independently of which national 
central bank did provide the loan. Such losses should normally be shared among the different National 
Central banks according to their share in the part of the capital of the ECB which is held by Eurozone 
countries. The Bundesbank should thus bear 30% of the losses, and should probably be recapitalized 
by the German government. 
  Monetary policy is going to be distorted  
In view of the net inflow of liquidities from the rest of the Euro zone, the German banks do not need to 
borrow liquidities from the Deutsche Bundesbank. To use the excess liquidity flowing in Germany 
through the TARGET related loans of the Bundesbank to other National Central banks, they even 
reimburse their net debt to the central bank. This is well described by the recent evolution of the 
liabilities of German banks to the Bundesbank. 





When they will have reimbursed their whole net debt to their National Central Banks, the banks of 
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland will be in a structural excess of liquidity as long as 
the imbalances in TARGET2 accounts last. Monetary policy in the Eurosystem will thus have to 
become asymmetric. The National Central Banks of the “debtor” countries will normally provide 
liquidities to their banks, but those of the few “creditor” countries will have to absorb liquidities.  
  How Germany is trapped 
Potential unlimited loans of National Central Banks to each other are absolutely necessary for 
the  existence  of  a  currency  union.  These  potentially  unlimited  loans  guarantee  that  euro 
balances in the banks of a given country can always be transformed into euro balances of the 
same value in the banks of another country of the zone. In front of the current capital outflows 
and  breakup  of  confidence,  the  Bundesbank  and  a  few  other  national  central  banks  are 
mechanically compelled to  grant  growing loans to  peripheral  countries.  It  means  that the 
balance of payments imbalances of the distressed countries benefit from a kind of monetary 































































































































































































































Liabilities of the German banks to the Bundesbank 
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